다음은 시스템클럽홈페이지  http://www.systemclub.co.kr  에 있는 것인데 뉴욕타임스 기사를 지만원 박사가 번역한 것인데 영어 기사도 있음. Name        지만원   Subject      백악관, 북한을 더 옥죌 것                              뉴욕타임즈: 미국 북한에 돈줄 더 죌 것 마카오 은행을 불랙리스트에 올린 지 6개월, 그 효과는 누구도 꿈꿀 수 없는 수준으로 나타내고 있다고 미국 고위관리가 말했다.   세계 모든 은행들이 북한과의 거래를 제한하고 있다. 이에 대해 김정일은 매우 보기 드문 감정으로 불만을 표출하고 있다.   “바로 중추신경을 찌른 거야” 미국관리는 웃으면서 말했다. 미행정부에는 ‘6자회담은 시간낭비이며 직접적인 제재만이 올바른 전술이라고 주장해온 관리들이 있으며, 이번 효과는 이런 관리들에게 힘을 실어주고 있다.   지난 9.15. 미재무부가 미국 은행들에게 BDA와의 거래를 중단하라고 명령한 이래 미행정부는 반복적으로 이 법률 집행이 핵협상과는 무관한 것이라는 주장만 (고장난 유성기처럼) 내내 반복해 왔다. 그런데 지금은 새로운 소리를 한다. 이제야 처음으로 미국 관리들은 더 많은 법률 집행조치들이 계획돼 있고, 이들이 모두 합쳐 하나의 전략으로 통합될 것이라는 사실을 밝히고 있는 것이다.   현직 및 전직 관리들은 부시행정부가 이런 직접적인 벌을 가하지 않는 한, 북한이 절대로 핵무기를 포기하지 않을 것이라는 결론을 얻었다고 말한다.     “쥐어짜되 협상은 계속한다” 더 가해지는 압력들에 다른 선택이 없으면 북한의 항복을 받아내는 데 기여할 것이다. 이란의 핵문제 시발이 유럽, 중동 그리고 미국행정부의 주의를 거의 독점하고 있지만, 미행정부 유관부서 관리들은 북한이 8-12개의 핵무기를 만들 수 있는 풀루토늄을 보유하고 있는 반면, 이란은 첫 번째 핵무기를 가지는 데에도 몇 년이 더 걸릴 것이라 믿고 있다. 지난 수요일(3.8), 북한은 2기의 단거리 미사일을 시험발사했으며, 이는 남한에 핵탄두를 날 릴 수 있는 것이었다. 몇몇 고위관리들은 지난 2년 반 동안, 열리고 중단되기를 반복하는 회담이 연속되면서 아무런 의미 있는 결과를 얻어내지 못한 것에 대해 화를 내고 있다. 미국과 몇 몇 국가들이 때때로 예를 들면 밀매품을 운반하는 선박을 나포하는 등, 북한에 대한 법률집행 조치들을 취해왔지만 이번의 새로운 정책은 훨씬 더 고강도의 조치들이며, 이는 북한의 분노를 자아낼 수 있을 것이다.       BDA에 대한 조치는 국제사회에 아주 강력한 효과를 냈으며, 북한 관리들이 지난 3월7일(화) 뉴욕에서 보기 드문 미팅에 응해 설명을 요청하고 동결된 자산을 풀어달라고 졸랐다. 뉴욕미팅에서 미국은 북한에 위폐와 세탁에 대한 매우 강력한 증거를 제시했다.   백악관은 재무부와 법무부에 각기 알아서 북한에 대한 법률적 금융적 조치들을 자유롭게 취하라는 재량권을 부여했다. 이러한 새로운 정책은 국무부가 이제까지 6자회담을 주도해온 관행과 너무 다르다.  국무부의 한 고위관리는 “새로운 정책은 북한에게 항복을 받아내는 메커니즘에 불과한 것이라고 불평했다. 몇몇 관리들은 또 새로운 정책이 북한이 핵을 포기하도록 설득할 수 없을뿐더러 중국 한국 등의 파트너를 소외시킬 수 있다고 우려했다. 하지만 또 다른 고위관리들은 우리가 이런 조치들을 취하기 전에 6자회담에서 얻은 게 없다며 새로운 조치를 지지했다.   수년간 체니를 비롯한 백악관 강경파들과 국무부 관리들은 직접적인 처벌조치만이 북한 핵을 포기시킬 수 있다고 주장해왔다.   체니측의 한 분석가는 "북한의 핵 포기 대가로 회담을 통해 줄 것이 별로 없다. 여러 가지 압력조치들이 동시다발적으로 가해져야 한다"고 말했다.   한 영향력 있는 인사는 이번 조치들이 예술적이라고까지 극찬했다. Squeezes North Korea's Money Flow Sign In to E-Mail This Printer-Friendly Reprints Save Article By JOEL BRINKLEY Published: March 10, 2006 WASHINGTON, March 9 — Six months after the Bush administration blacklisted a bank in Macao accused of laundering money for the North Korean government, senior administration officials say the action has proved to be far more effective than anyone had dreamed. Banks around the world are limiting their dealings with North Korea, and the nation's leadership is complaining with a vigor unusual even for that government. "It really struck a nerve," a senior administration official said with a smile. It also has given new energy to those in the administration who have argued for years that the six-nation nuclear disarmament talks were a waste of time and that direct action was the only tactic that might force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. Since the Treasury Department ordered American banks to cut off relations with the Macao bank, Banco Delta Asia, on Sept. 15, the administration has repeatedly insisted that the law enforcement action was unrelated to the nuclear negotiations. Only now are officials saying that further law enforcement actions are planned, and their use has coalesced into a strategy. In interviews, several present and former administration officials said the Bush administration had concluded that the six-nation talks intended to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear arms were unlikely to succeed unless they were accompanied by these direct, punitive actions. The strategy now, said a senior official who watches the issue closely, is, "Squeeze them, but keep the negotiations going." The talks would then serve as little more than a vehicle for accepting North Korea's capitulation, if the pressure from other actions leaves it no choice. Iran's budding nuclear program is capturing most of the government attention here, in Europe and in the Middle East. But senior officials across the government involved with North Korea policy pointedly note that North Korea is already believed to have enough plutonium to make 8 to 12 nuclear weapons, while Iran is probably years away from having the capability to make its first. On Wednesday, North Korea test fired two short-range missiles that could carry a warhead to South Korea. Several senior officials said the administration had grown deeply frustrated with the on-again, off-again talks that have seemed to produce few meaningful results, even after two and a half years. While the United States and other nations have for years pursued occasional law enforcement actions against North Korea — seizing ships carrying contraband, for example — the new policy envisions even more high-profile actions that are likely to anger North Korea. The action against Banco Delta Asia was so effective in causing a ripple effect around the world that North Korean officials held an unusual meeting with American officials on Tuesday in New York, seeking an explanation and "trying to get their money unfrozen," a senior official said. American officials told the North Koreans that the United States had strong evidence that among the cash laundered through the Macao bank was a large amount of counterfeit American currency printed by the North Korean government. Senior officials said the White House has given the Treasury and Justice departments full authority to take additional legal and financial actions against North Korea. This policy is not uniformly popular in the State Department, where officials are managing the six-nations talks that include the United States, Russia, South Korea, China and Japan. One senior official complained that the policy would turn the talks into nothing more than "a surrender mechanism." Several officials said they feared that the new policy would not persuade North Korea to disarm, while also alienating China, North Korea's ally, and South Korea. But another senior official argued, "Not everything was great with the six-party talks before we ratcheted up the defensive measures," as advocates like to call the law enforcement actions. The officials declined to be identified by name because they were discussing internal deliberations and decisions without being authorized to speak for their departments. For years, hard-liners in the White House, particularly in Vice President Dick Cheney's office, and some at the State Department, have argued that direct punitive action against North Korea was the only tactic that might force it to give up its nuclear weapons program. "It seems to me unreal that you could offer the regime enough" in talks "to get them to abandon their program," said Aaron L. Friedberg, an East Asia specialist who was Mr. Cheney's deputy national security adviser until last summer. "There has to be something else happening simultaneously — applying pressure." Despite those arguments, through most of last year the administration worked assiduously to limit critical comments and actions that North Korea could seize on as excuses to boycott the negotiations. At South Korea's urging, Mr. Bush and his aides stopped characterizing North Korea's leader as a "tyrant'" or repeating Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's statement that the country was an "outpost of tyranny." Finally, by late summer, a former senior Bush administration official said, the administration had decided "to move toward more confrontational measures." David L. Asher, who was coordinator of the State Department's working group until last summer, said government officials believed "the beauty of this approach is it is not full-bore sanctions." Last September, North Korea agreed in principle to end its nuclear weapons program but raised objections to the agreement just 24 hours later. "I think they are having trouble getting ready for that moment" when they actually give up their arms, said Christopher R. Hill, assistant secretary of state and chief United States negotiator for the talks. "They are stalling. That makes people wonder about how serious they are."