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제목 美국무부 “北 테러지원국 재지정 언제든 가능” (연합뉴스)/미국국무부-Daily Press Briefing
글쓴이 연합뉴스,미국무부 등록일 2008-12-11
출처 연합뉴스, 미국무부 조회수 1457

다음은 동아닷컴  http://www.donga.com 에 있는 연합뉴스의

기사입니다.

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분야 : 정치   2008.12.11(목) 07:41 편집


美국무부 “北 테러지원국 재지정 언제든 가능”

 


중국 베이징(北京)에서 열린 북핵 6자 수석대표회담이 아무런 성과를 거두지 못하고 결렬된 가운데 미국은 북한이 핵검증 체제에 동의하지 않으면 북한을 다시 테러지원국으로 지정하는 것은 언제든 가능한 일이라면서 현재도 북한에 대해 여전히 많은 제재가 취해지고 있다고 미 국무부는 10일 밝혔다.
 

숀 매코맥 국무부 대변인은 북한이 핵검증체제에 대한 약속을 끝까지 지키지 않는다면 "(북한에 대한 테러지원국 재지정은) 언제나 가능한 일이라고 생각한다"면서 "그러나 이것은 그들의 행동에 달렸으며 우리는 북한이 어떤 행동을 보일지 지켜볼

것"이라고 말했다.

그는 "북한이 이 문제에 많은 관심을 보인 것을 알고 있을 것"이라면서 "우리는 법에 따른 책임이 있기 때문에 그 문제(테러지원국 해제조치)를 매우 진지하게 다뤘다"고 말했다.

매코맥 대변인은 또 "북한을 테러지원국 명단에서 삭제한 것은 사실과 법에 근거한 것이었다"면서 "테러리스트 지원국 명단에서 삭제하거나 포함시키는 것은 법에명백하게 규정돼 있어 그 규정을 충족시켜야 한다"고 덧붙였다.

하지만, 매코맥 대변인은 현재 미국이 북한에 대해 영향력을 행사할 수 있는 지렛대가 테러지원국 재지정 밖에 없는 게 아니냐는 질문에는 "테러지원국 해제는 북한과 나머지 세계교역에 실질적인 영향을 준 것이 아니며 미국과 교역에도 조금도 변화를 가져다주지 않았다"면서 "북한에 대한 여러 가지 제재방안이 여전히 많이 있다"고 설명했다.

그는 테러해제 지원국 해제 당시, 북한에 계속 취해지는 다양한 제재 조치들에 대해 브리핑했었다면서 북한은 미국은 물론 나머지 세계 국가들과도 정상적인 관계를 맺지 못하고 있으며 북한의 비핵화로 한반도가 비핵화될 때 북한은 나머지 세계국가들과 더 많은 정상적인 관계를 맺게 되고 이에 따른 경제적 기회를 포함한 혜택을 누리게 될 것이라고 지적했다.

워싱턴의 한 북한 전문가는 이와 관련, "미국의 지난 10월 대(北)북한 테러지원국 해제조치가 상징적인 조치의 하나였으며 실질적으로는 북한에 대해 여전히 많은 제재가 가해지고 있다는 것을 뜻한다"면서 "테러지원국 재지정에 대한 입장도 그동안 테러지원국 해제 조치 당시에 밝혔던 원칙적인 입장을 다시 재확인한 것이라고 본다"고 말했다.

한편, 매코맥 대변인은 이날 베이징 6자 수석대표회담에서 핵검증의정서에 시료채취를 명문화하는 합의에 도달하지 못했음을 인정했다.

그는 "우리는 북한과 시료채취에 대해 합의에 도달했다고 이해했고 그러한 이해를 문서화하려고 했다"면서 그러나 "우리는 그렇게 하지 못했다"고 말했다.

(워싱턴=연합뉴스)

 

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다음은 미국국무부 http://www.state.gov 에 있는  Daily Press Briefing  에서

 

 Sean McCormack, Spokesman 이 6자회담 등에 대한 에 대한 논평의 일부분임


Washington, DC    December 10, 2008

 

아래는  기자회견문중에 있는 것입니다.

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아래

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  QUESTION:   --------- you could always put North Korea back on the terrorism list. Is that being considered at this point?


 

MR. MCCORMACK: Look, I guess – I suppose these things are always possible.

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아래

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QUESTION: I think the Secretary Rice herself and several other officials have said that if North Korea doesn’t, in the end, adhere to this verification – to a verification regime, you could always put North Korea back on the terrorism list. Is that being considered at this point?


 

MR. MCCORMACK: Look, I guess – I suppose these things are always possible. You know, I don’t know the ins and outs of the law, but I think that they’re – you know, it’s based on behavior. And we’ll see what behavior North Korea engages in.

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다음

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QUESTION: On North Korea, there were reports overnight quoting South Korea’s Foreign Minister, I think, as saying that North Korea had refused to – it might have been the South Korean head of delegation – I simply don’t remember now, I’m sorry – as saying that North Korea had refused to allow samples to be removed from its nuclear facilities. Is that true?

MR. MCCORMACK: I’ll check for you. I don’t know. I don’t know what we have done in terms of sampling. I know sampling is an issue in the verification protocol in the discussions that are ongoing now in Beijing. I think Chris is giving a little bit of a blow by blow in terms of coming and going from the meetings. I haven’t spoken with Chris, so I can’t offer any more detail than he has offered you, just to repeat what he said. Thus far, the discussions haven’t trended in the right direction.

QUESTION: Can you double check on that one, on that specific point?

MR. MCCORMACK: On whether or not they’ve – whether or not, to this point, they’ve allowed samples?

QUESTION: To whether or not, to this point, their position has been that they will refuse to allow samples to be removed.

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, there’s an understanding that we arrived at in the negotiations with North Korea regarding sampling. And that is part of the exercise that is ongoing in Beijing right now, is to get all of those understandings initialed and agreed upon so that there is a common understanding among the Six Parties. We haven’t succeeded in that. I would only refer back to the briefing we had here a couple of months ago – I can’t even remember the date – with myself, Sung Kim and a couple others in which we talked about the agreement that had been arrived at with North Korea on behalf of all the other parties.

We’ll see how it turns out. We know it was agreed to. It’s a matter of now getting that initialed by all of the parties, and we’ll see where the discussions turn out.

At the moment, Chris is scheduled to leave Beijing tomorrow afternoon, their time. So we’ll – you know, we’ll see. I mean, it could be the case that he does keep to a schedule or it could be the case that if there are productive discussions, he continues to stay there. So we’ll see how things evolve.

QUESTION: And – sorry, that’s – is he coming straight home? Is he scheduled to come straight home from there?

MR. MCCORMACK: I think so. I think so. I mean –

QUESTION: And tomorrow afternoon their time?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yes, yeah, yeah. I mean, you know, I say this with all the caveats that,
you know, Chris Hill’s travel schedule is probably one of the more flexible things that I have ever seen. He can change it, and he changes it quite often. So we’ll see. We’ll see how it evolves.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Considering that you took North Korea off the terrorism list already, what leverage do you have at this point in this particular process in Beijing right now to get them to sign on to the understandings you believed you had?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, at the time – at the time of our briefing, we also released a list, a multi-page list of all the various other sanctions that continue to apply to North Korea. So that act notwithstanding, North Korea does not have a normal relationship with the rest of the world, never mind the United States. And part of this process whereby North Korea would denuclearize, and the Korean Peninsula would be denuclearized, is that North Korea would gradually come to have a more normal relationship with the rest of the world and thereby gain benefits, have more interaction with the rest of the world, it could be more economic opportunities, a lot of other things that would redound to the benefit of the North Korean people.

That’s not where we are at this point. So there’s a lot of – there is a lot of leverage. There’s a lot of incentive for North Korea. Now, whether or not the North Korean regime decides that those incentives and those possible benefits are worth changing their behavior is a calculation only they can make. We can set out the different visions. We can lay out the incentives – we, meaning the other five parties. But it’s going to be up to them whether or not they take up the other five parties on that pathway.

There is, of course, another pathway, and we all know what that is. We’re focused on trying to go down the more positive pathway, and we’ll see what decision, what calculation the North Korean regime makes.

QUESTION: You know, Sean –

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: I think the Secretary Rice herself and several other officials have said that if North Korea doesn’t, in the end, adhere to this verification – to a verification regime, you could always put North Korea back on the terrorism list. Is that being considered at this point?

MR. MCCORMACK: Look, I guess – I suppose these things are always possible. You know, I don’t know the ins and outs of the law, but I think that they’re – you know, it’s based on behavior. And we’ll see what behavior North Korea engages in.

And again, you know, I know that, you know, North Korea put a lot of focus on that, and some have put a lot of focus on that, and we took that action very seriously, because we have certain responsibilities under the law. But if you just go down the list of sanctions that continue to apply –

QUESTION: But that was the one that they really cared about, so I mean, when we talk about leverage --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it – the – I mean – but –

QUESTION: – I mean, that may be the only leverage you have is to put them back on.

MR. MCCORMACK: That’s fine, but it has no material effect on the relationship with the rest of the world. It didn’t change one iota their ability to trade with the United States.

QUESTION: Well, it didn’t have one iota when you took them off.

MR. MCCORMACK: Exactly my point. So there’s still a lot of leverage in place.

Yeah.

QUESTION: In Belarus, any updates on Mr. Zeltser?

MR. MCCORMACK: I don’t. We’ll check for you.

QUESTION: Do you feel like you got snookered by the North Koreans by having taken them off the list, reached understandings that were not written down about the verification protocol, and now having to go through such an agonizing process to try to get those things written down?

MR. MCCORMACK: No. Because we had a thorough understanding, a very precise understanding of what was agreed to, and we had that on paper ourselves. And, you know, it’s – they have a unique way of doing business. And you know, we’re not going to play into their way of doing business. We know what was agreed upon. We have it on paper. We have a solid understanding of it. Other countries within the Six-Party Talks share that understanding. And we’ll see if North Korea will now take that final step. And if they don’t, then potentially you go down another pathway.

QUESTION: But Sean –

MR. MCCORMACK: And we’re equally prepared to do both.

QUESTION: But you did play into their way of doing business, because you did take them off the list prior to having their explicit written agreement to the verification list that you say you agreed upon verbally and wrote down.

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: I mean, you took them off the terrorism list, and then six months later –

MR. MCCORMACK: The act of taking them off the terrorism list, State Sponsor of Terrorism List, was based on fact. It’s based on the law. There are certain – the law is very explicit about what gets you on the list and what gets you off the list. There is no cutting corners. You either meet the requirements or you don’t. And according to our reading of the law and regulations – and there was a public comment period allowed on this – they had met those requirements.

But – and I’m not trying to in any way diminish our view of the significance of complying with law and regulation. It’s absolute. But if you look at the actual material effect on our relationship with North Korea, I don’t see that it changed it in any way whatsoever.

QUESTION: Well, I’m looking less at the material effect on your relationship with – on the United States’ relationship with North Korea than I am at the material effect on the conduct of the U.S. Government’s negotiations with North Korea, where you gave them something that they wanted, however meaningless it might be in practical terms, and they didn’t give you what you wanted.

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm. Well, you also have the fact that Yongbyon has reached a state of disablement that it has never had before. So it’s not as if there was status quo in North Korea and outside of North Korea, everything else changed. That’s not the case, not the case at all. And this is a case where it’s action for action. So there’s a – absolutely, there’s a balancing of that within the negotiations and you know, on our part as well as on the part of the other parties in the Six-Party Talks. You know, and the fact of the matter is, if North Korea doesn’t perform, doesn’t continue to perform on expectations, it’s not going to realize the benefits.

QUESTION: And last thing for me on this, it seems to me that you are taking a slightly harder tone now, particularly your comment that we are equally prepared to go either way. You know, for a long time, you have really been trying to accent the positive and trying to work on this path and get them to, you know, carry through all of the steps generally laid out in the September 2005 agreement. Is that a fair reading now that you are, in fact, looking a little harder at the stick end of things, rather than the carrot end of things?

MR. MCCORMACK: No, no. Look, I can – I should have had the exact date for you, but I don’t know, within the past six months or so, Secretary Rice herself has been down here in the briefing room specifically – you know, did an opening statement on North Korea and all of these questions of verification. And I think if you go back and look at that transcript and, you know, transcripts before as well as after, you will see that this idea of the two pathways is there, that, you know, perhaps one day at a briefing I may not emphasize one pathway to the – and emphasize another. It’s not intended to indicate that the two pathways don’t exist or that they’re not equally likely. I mean, we don’t know.

The fact of matter is that North Korea still hasn’t made that strategic decision to denuclearize. They’ve taken some steps and there are indications that they were leaning that way, but they haven’t taken those fundamental steps. Part of – you know, part of that equation in making the assessment, have they taken those steps, you know, have they made a final decision to denuclearize, is a verification protocol and implementation of that verification protocol. I mean, the ultimate metric in judging that is the fact that they don’t – they no longer have a nuclear program. You know, we’re not near that stage at this point. But you know, there are important other weigh points along the way. This verification protocol is one of them.

QUESTION: Do you – Sean, do you think that it’s the responsibility of this Administration to get a deal on the verification or take measures, punitive measures, against North Korea or do you – or are you considering leaving it to the next administration to continue the negotiations on a deal?

MR. MCCORMACK: As with all things, we view it as our responsibility to do what’s in the best interests of the United States and its interests. And you know, there’s no specific formula for that. It’s a case-by-case thing. In terms of the Iran – in establishing an interests section in Iran, the Secretary and the President took a look at it, then she explained to you our reasoning behind it. Each case is going to be different. Middle East peace, the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, that’s a separate case. We take each on their own terms, and we’re going to take a look at what is in the best interests of the United States and, you know, the goals of our national security and foreign policy.

And there’s also – again, I would go back to the point that I made earlier in the briefing to Bob’s question. There’s good information flow here. And we are being as transparent as we possibly can with the incoming folks. They’re going to make their own set of decisions. You know, I can’t tell you what those are going to be, as is their prerogative. We are going to continue to act up until January 20th at 12:01 in what we believe are the best interests of the United States.

Yes.

QUESTION: Just one more. On the disablement of Yongbyon, this has been going on for more than a year now. Are you satisfied currently with the pace of disablement that is occurring there right now?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we would have liked to have had it done already, as would the – our other four parties that aren’t North Korea in the Six-Party Talks. It’s going at a pace appropriate to – you know, to the course of the negotiations itself. We would have liked to have moved beyond this point. You’ve heard us say that. We haven’t. But that doesn’t – you know, that doesn’t change our calculation. We still know what the goal is. We know what North Korea, as well as the other five parties, committed to back in ’05 and ’06 and ’07. We’re going to continue along that pathway.

QUESTION: Sean.

MR. MCCORMACK: Sylvie.

QUESTION: Did you have the time to check this question about Georgia and how the Saakashvili government used the money, the aid money?

MR. MCCORMACK: I do. I did. And what I would – I would ask your indulgence because – I’ll give you an idea. This is stamped “draft,” but we’ll release it. So this is the answer. And if you guys would like for me to read it – I’m seeing negative reactions on that – I’ll post it up immediately after the briefing. It’s a detailed readout.

QUESTION: But can you tell me briefly if they used it to build a luxury hotel, as it was reported?

MR. MCCORMACK: (Laughter.) Let me post the answer that we have here. And if you have any further questions, then I’m happy to take it on.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Sounds like a yes to me.

MR. MCCORMACK: (Laughter.) No. No, no. Read the text.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Another issue on North Korea.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: North Korea state media Chosŏn Central News Agency reported today that U.S. Government publicly acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear power for the first time. They cited a recent Defense Department annual report which has stated that there are five nuclear powers in Asia, which are China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Russia. So what is your comment on North Korea’s claim that U.S. Government publicly acknowledged them as a nuclear power?

MR. MCCORMACK: That is not our national policy, and that document does not – the document they referenced does not represent the official views of the United States.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 11:05 a.m.)

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