다음은 조선닷컴 http://www.chosun.com 에 있는 기사임. 연합뉴스의 기사라고 함. 이 기사 뒤에 워싱턴포스트의 영문 기사를 올릴 것임. WP "北에 핵이전시 보복당한다는 위협느끼도록 해야" 부시는 ‘쿠바사태’ 때 케네디의 대응 참고해야 북한의 핵무기 이전을 막기 위해선 미국이나 미국의 동맹국이 북한에서 만들어진 핵폭탄의 공격을 받을 경우 북한이 핵미사일로 미국을 공격한 것으로 간주, 미국은 보복할 것이라는 위협을 뼈저리게 느끼게 해야 한다고 미국의 군사전문가가 27일 주장했다. 빌 클린턴 행정부에서 국방부 차관보를 지낸 그레이험 앨리슨은 이날 워싱턴포스트(WP) 기고문에서 “미국은 김정일에게 ‘핵개발 안된다’, ‘미사일 발사안된다’, ‘핵실험 안된다’고 요구했지만 모두 무시당했다”면서 이같이 말했다. 앨리슨은 적에게 용납되지 않는 일을 했을 경우 치러야할 대가가 그런 행동을 통해 얻기를 바라는 이득보다 훨씬 크다는 것을 확신시킬 때만이 억제정책은 효과가 있는 것이라면서 “미국은 김정일에게 모든 북한산 핵무기에 책임을 지게 될 것임을 느끼도록 해 핵이전을 막아야 한다”고 지적했다. 그는 또 미국은 김정일에게 미국의 핵감식기관이 영변원자로에서 추출한 핵물질을 식별할 능력이 있음을 알도록 하고, 북한산 핵폭탄이 미국이나 동맹국 영토에서 폭발할 경우 미국은 마치 북한이 핵미사일로 미국을 공격한 것처럼 보복할 것임을 뼛속 깊이 느끼도록 해야 한다고 강조했다. 이어 그는 지난 1962년 초반 쿠바 미사일 사태 때 당시 존 F 케네디 대통령이 구(舊)소련 후르시초프 서기장에게 쿠바 미사일이 미국이나 서방국가를 공격할 경우 소련이 미국에 공격한 것으로 간주, 보복하겠다고 분명하게 경고를 보낸 것을 참고해야 한다고 덧붙였다. 워싱턴=연합뉴스 입력 : 2006.10.27 22:21 40' ------------------------------------------------------------- 다음은 워싱턴포스트 http://www.washingtonpost.com 에 있는 기사임. Deterring Kim Jong Il By Graham Allison Friday, October 27, 2006; A23 In an interview aired last week, George Stephanopoulos put the question to President Bush: What would he do if "North Korea sold nukes to Iran or al-Qaeda?" Bush replied, "They'd be held to account." Seeking specifics, Stephanopoulos asked: "What does that mean?" The president answered, "I want the leader of North Korea to understand that he'll be held to account. Just like he's being held to account now for having run a test ." Say what? If North Korea sells a nuclear weapon to Osama bin Laden or Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he should expect the United States to go to the United Nations and negotiate further sanctions? And if al-Qaeda sneaks that bomb into the United States and we awake to the president's nightmare in which a mushroom cloud engulfs Washington or Los Angeles, then what? If this formulation stands -- without further specification -- America risks becoming the victim of a catastrophic "deterrence failure." Deterrence emerged as a central concept in Cold War strategy. It meant convincing the adversary that the costs of taking an unacceptable action would greatly exceed any benefits it could hope to achieve. How did the United States prevent the Soviets from seizing Berlin? By convincing Soviet leaders that such an attack would trigger a response that would destroy their country. Effective deterrence required three components: clarity, capability and credibility. Clarity meant bright lines and unacceptable consequences. Credibility was understood to be in the eye of the beholder. How credible was the threat to trade Boston for Berlin? Never 100 percent. But U.S. forces, exercises and communication were crafted to convince Soviet leaders they dare not test it. To date the Bush administration has demonstrably failed to deter Kim Jong Il. Successive U.S. demands that Kim not develop nuclear weapons, not test a missile and not test a nuclear bomb have been defied. In each case, the president has asserted that this would be "intolerable." Pressed to be precise about what this threat meant, however, Bush refused, responding instead, "I don't think you give timelines to dictators and tyrants." National security adviser Stephen Hadley has gone further, arguing that red lines make no sense in dealing with North Korea because "the North Koreans just walk right up to them and step over them." Having stiffed Bush -- and the world -- in building a nuclear arsenal, testing a long-range missile and testing a nuclear weapon, might Kim now imagine that he could also sell nuclear weapons? America's challenge is to prevent this act by convincing Kim that he will be held accountable for every nuclear weapon that originates in North Korea. This requires clarity, credibility about our capacity to identify the source of a bomb that explodes in one of our cities (however it is delivered by whomever) and a believable threat to respond. Kim must be convinced that American nuclear forensics will be able to identify the molecular fingerprint of nuclear material from his Yongbyon reactor. He must feel in his gut the threat that if a nuclear weapon of North Korean origin explodes on American soil or that of a U.S. ally, the United States will retaliate precisely as if North Korea had attacked the United States with a nuclear-armed missile: with an overwhelming response that guarantees this will never happen again. Here, the president can take a page from President John F. Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis. In 1962, as the Soviet Union was emplacing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba, some worried that these weapons could be transferred to a young revolutionary named Fidel Castro. Kennedy issued an unambiguous warning to Nikita Khrushchev. "It shall be the policy of this nation," he announced, "to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." Khrushchev knew that meant a nuclear war. The writer, an assistant secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton, is director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and the author of "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe." © 2006 The Washington Post Company