다음은 데일리엔케이 http://www.dailynk.com 에 있는 기사임. 연합뉴스의 기사라고 함. 이 기사와 관련이 있는 "폭스 뉴스 TV"라이스 미국 국무장관의 인터뷰 기사의 영어 기사를 올릴 것이고, "동아닷컴"의 <국제사회 대북압박 수위 높인다…G8 “6자 조기복귀”> 라는 기사를 올리고, 라이스 장관이 언급한 대량살상무기 확산방지구상: PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative)에 대한 미국 국무부의 자료를 올릴 것임. ---------------------------------------- 라이스 “대북 금융제재, PSI 계속” "안보리 결의 모든 회원국에 구속력 있어" [2006-07-17 13:54 연합] ▲ 콘돌리자 라이스 미 국무장관 콘돌리자 라이스 미 국무장관은 16일(현지시각) 북한에 대한 안보리의 결의 외에 "금융조치들을 통한 북한의 불법활동 저지, 확산방지구상(PSI) 활동 등이 이뤄지고 있으며, 앞으로도 이들 활동을 계속할 것"이라고 말했다. 라이스 장관은 폭스뉴스 TV와 인터뷰에서 안보리 결의에 대한 북한의 거부와 관련, 이렇게 말하고 특히 "북한은 한반도에서의 안보균형에 관해 혼동하지 않고 있다. 우리는 한반도에서 강력한 억지력을 보유하고 있다"고 강조했다. 그는 "우리는 한국 및 일본과 강력한 동맹을 맺고 있으며, 앞으로도 계속 이를 추구해나갈 것"이라고 말했다. 라이스 장관은 지난해 5월 북한이 6자회담 복귀를 거부함으로써 긴장이 고조되고 있을 때도 프랑스 외교장관과 회담 후 가진 기자회견에서 북한의 핵문제에 대해 언급하면서 "미국은 아시아태평양지역에 모든 종류의 '실질적인(significant)' 억지력을 유지하고 있다"고 북한에 경고했었다. 폭스뉴스와 인터뷰에서 라이스 장관은 대북 안보리 결의가 1993년 이래 처음 이뤄진 점과 중국의 찬성을 특기하면서 "이 결의는 매우 강력한 것이며, 모든 회원국에 구속력이 있는 것"이라고 말했다. 라이스 장관은 안보리 결의에 대한 북한의 "첫 반응이 거부라는 것에 놀라지 않았다"며 "그게 북한 방식"이라고 말하고 "그러나 북한은 결의의 강도와 국제사회의 일치된 목소리에 좀 놀랐을 것"이라고 덧붙였다./연합 --------------------------------------------------------------- 다음은 Fox TV 뉴스 http://www.foxnews.com 에 있는 기사임. Chris Wallace 가 Rice 미국무부장관과의 인터뷰 기사 중에 앞의 기사와 관 련이 있는 부분임. < through a proliferation security initiative denying North Korea certain kinds of materials> WALLACE: One final question. We have a couple of minutes left, Secretary Rice. The U.N. Security Council yesterday passed a resolution condemning North Korea's launch of those seven missiles on the 4th of July, but the U.S. had to back down on its call for any reference to Chapter 7, which would make any kind of resolution of that sort enforceable by military action. And in fact, North Korea now has rejected the measure and they say that they are going to boost their, quote, deterrent. In fact, do you see any chance that this resolution is going to change North Korea's behavior? RICE: Well, first of all, this is the first resolution, Chris, since 1993 on North Korea, and the Chinese voted affirmatively for a resolution that demands that North Korea stop its activities that are jeopardizing international peace and security. The Chinese voted affirmatively with the rest of the Security Council to require member states to take steps to prevent North Korea from obtaining dangerous materials. This is a very strong resolution. It is binding on member states. And it says to the North Koreans you're isolated, come back to the six-party talks. Now, I'm not surprised that the first reaction of the North Koreans is to reject it. That's the way that the North Koreans are. But they've got to be a little surprised at the strength of the resolution. They've got to be a little surprised that the unity of the community was maintained. And by the way, we are, of course, engaged in other activities outside the Security Council, including checking illicit activities of North Korea through financial measures, through a proliferation security initiative denying North Korea certain kinds of materials, and we're going to continue to do those, too. And North Korea, of course, is not confused about the security balance on the Korean peninsula. We have a strong deterrent force there. We have strong alliances with South Korea and with Japan, and we'll continue to pursue those as well. ----------------------------------------------------------- 국제사회 대북압박 수위 높인다…G8 “6자 조기복귀” (동아닷컴) 다음은 동아닷컴 http://www.donga.com 에 있는 기사임. 국제사회 대북압박 수위 높인다…G8 “6자 조기복귀” 유엔 안전보장이사회의 대북 제재 결의안 채택 이후 미국과 일본을 중심으로 북한에 대한 국제사회의 압박 수위가 높아가고 있다. 미국은 기존 금융제재와 대량살상무기 확산방지구상(PSI)을 강화하면서 북한의 6자회담 복귀를 종용한다는 방침이고, 일본은 구체적인 제재 조치 검토에 들어가는 등 발 빠르게 움직이고 있다. 콘돌리자 라이스 미 국무장관은 17일(한국 시간) G8(선진 7개국+러시아) 정상회의가 열리고 있는 러시아 상트페테르부르크에서 기자회견을 열고 북한이 6자회담에 복귀하지 않으면 ‘추가 압력’에 직면할 것이라고 강하게 경고했다. 라이스 장관은 또 폭스뉴스 인터뷰에서 대북 금융제재와 PSI 활동도 계속해 나갈 것이라고 강조했다. 그러나 그는 “북한이 6자회담에 돌아오면 대화에 끌어들일(engage) 것”이라고 말해 6자회담 틀 속에서 북-미 간 직접 대화도 할 수 있음을 시사했다. 워싱턴포스트 등 외신들은 안보리 결의안 통과로 미국 주도의 PSI 활동이 국제법적 근거를 갖게 될 것이라고 보도했다. 북한의 미사일과 대량살상무기(WMD)를 실은 선박에 대한 정선 나포 압류 등 대북 포위망이 한층 좁혀질 것이라는 전망이다. 일본 정부는 이날 외무성과 금융청 등 관계기관 과장급 협의를 열어 구체적인 제재 조치 검토에 들어갔다. 첫 번째 조치로 일본은 북한에 대한 송금을 규제하기로 했다고 아사히신문이 17일 보도했다. 일본은 금융제재를 위해 정부가 독자 판단으로 대북 송금이나 특정 품목의 수출입을 정지시킬 수 있도록 규정한 개정 외환법(2004년 2월)을 활용할 예정이며, 제재의 실효성을 높이기 위해 다른 나라에도 협조를 요청할 방침이다. 일부 북한 전문가는 “2005년 기준으로 214억 엔 규모인 북한과 일본의 수출입을 전면 금지하면 북한 국내총생산(GDP)이 7% 줄어들고 20만 명이 일자리를 잃을 것”이라고 분석하고 있다. G8 정상들은 이틀째 회담에서 ‘비확산’에 관한 별도의 성명을 내고 “북한의 미사일 발사는 지역과 세계의 평화, 안정, 안보를 위험에 빠뜨리는 것”이라고 규탄했다. 정상들은 특히 북한이 ‘추가 발사가 가능하다’고 시사한 데 대해 “심각하게 우려한다”고 덧붙이고 6자회담 조기 복귀 필요성에 합의했다. ▼정부 “PSI 정식참여 안할것”▼ 한편 한국 정부는 미국이 안보리 결의안 채택을 계기로 한국의 PSI 적극 참여를 요청해올 가능성이 있다고 보고 이에 대해 논의한 것으로 알려졌다. 정부 관계자는 “미국은 북한이 미사일을 발사하기 전부터 한국 정부에 PSI 적극 참여를 요청해 왔다”며 “그러나 현재로선 북한과의 관계를 고려해 PSI 정식 참여와 역내외 훈련에 대한 물적 지원은 하지 않는다는 기존 방침에 변화가 없다”고 말했다. 이철희 기자 klimt@donga.com 이명건 기자 gun43@donga.com 도쿄=천광암 특파원 iam@donga.com :대량살상무기 확산방지구상: 테러와의 전쟁을 위해 불법 무기나 미사일 기술을 실은 것으로 의심되는 항공기나 선박을 압수 수색하는 것을 허용하는 내용. 2003년 5월 당시 폴란드를 방문 중이던 조지 W 부시 미국 대통령이 공식 발표했다. 발족 당시엔 미국, 영국, 호주, 프랑스, 독일, 이탈리아, 일본, 네덜란드, 폴란드, 포르투갈, 스페인 등 11개국이 참가했다. 그러나 일각에서는 PSI가 국제법상의 ‘공해 통항의 자유’를 위협하는 초법적 구상이라는 비판도 제기해 왔다. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 다음은 미국 국무부의 홈페이지 http://www.state.cov 에 있는 것임. The Proliferation Security Initiative Bureau of Nonproliferation Washington, DC July 28, 2004 [An updated version of this document dated May 26, 2005, is located at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/46858.htm] What Is the Proliferation Security Initiative? A Global Initiative The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. Announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, it stems from the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to defeat the proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed. Being Proactive The goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing proliferation to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Actions will be taken in support of the PSI consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. The PSI seeks to use existing authorities -- national and international -- to defeat proliferation. Statement of Interdiction Principles In September 2003, 11 countries -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- agreed to and published the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. Since then, many more countries have endorsed the Principles. This set of principles identifies specific steps for effectively interdicting WMD shipments and preventing proliferation facilitators from engaging in this deadly trade. Participation in the PSI is voluntary. PSI partners encourage all states to publicly support the PSI, and to take the steps outlined in the principles, including steps in support of PSI operational activities. Support for the PSI is an acknowledgment of the need for stronger measures to defeat proliferators through cooperation with other countries. PSI Is a Part of the Solution The PSI is part of an overall counterproliferation effort intended to apply intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, and other tools at our disposal to prevent transfers of WMD-related items to countries and entities of concern. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, called on all states to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD. The PSI is a positive way to take such cooperative action. Why Do We Need the PSI? States have cooperated for many years to prevent specific shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials from taking place. But these efforts have tended to be ad hoc and have mainly focused on items in ports. Gaining Senior Government-Level Attention Today뭩 clearer understanding of the threat of WMD terrorism, has brought more widespread appreciation that WMD proliferation is an urgent international security challenge. Higher-priority attention at senior government levels and more concerted efforts before and after an illicit shipment heads toward its destination are needed. Halting Proliferation-Related Shipments In addition to the increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures taken by proliferators and their facilitators to circumvent export controls, we also are dealing with a relatively new dynamic where proliferators are shipping to proliferators. This trend further limits opportunities to stop shipments before they are en route. The PSI builds on our interdiction experience to date and uses the full range of counterproliferation tools -- from diplomacy to intelligence to operations -- to stop WMD and missile-related proliferation at sea, in the air, and on land. How Does the PSI Work? Partnerships The PSI is a set of activities, not a formal treaty-based organization. It is best understood as a set of partnerships that establishes the basis for cooperation on specific activities, when the need arises. It does not create formal "obligations" for participating states, but does represent a political commitment to establish "best practices" to stop proliferation-related shipments. PSI interdiction training exercises and other operational efforts will help states work together in a more cooperative, coordinated, and effective manner to stop, search, and seize shipments. Coordination The focus of PSI is on establishing greater coordination among its partner states and a readiness to act effectively when a particular action is needed. Actual interdictions will likely involve only a few PSI participants with geographic and operational access to a particular PSI target of opportunity. By working together, PSI partners will combine their capabilities in a way that adds up to more than their individual efforts. How Can States Participate in the PSI? There are many countries that can play a helpful role in building global counterproliferation capabilities. There are also countries -- such as flagship, coastal, or transshipment states, or states along major air shipment corridors -- whose cooperation is essential to counterproliferation efforts involving cargoes in transit. Since the Statement of Interdiction Principles was agreed upon and made public in early September 2003, many states worldwide have indicated their strong support for these principles and their interest in cooperating actively on PSI efforts. States are becoming involved in the PSI in varying ways. Some states, for example, have attended interdiction training exercises or informational meetings to help build the basis for effective cooperation. Participation in the PSI will continue to expand based on countries' responses to the initiative. There are also concrete steps that states can take to establish the basis for their participation in the PSI. These include: Formally committing to and publicly endorsing the PSI and the Statement of Interdiction Principles, and indicating willingness to take all steps available to support PSI efforts. Undertaking a review and providing information on current national legal authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air, or on land, and indicating willingness to strengthen authorities, where appropriate. Identifying specific national "assets" that might contribute to PSI efforts (e.g., information sharing, military, and/or law enforcement assets). Providing points of contact for PSI assistance requests and other operational activities, and establishing appropriate internal government processes to coordinate PSI response efforts. Being willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual operations as opportunities arise. Being willing to conclude relevant agreements (e.g., boarding arrangements) or otherwise to establish a concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts. What Is the Future of the PSI? PSI is a lasting initiative that over time will establish a web of counterproliferation partnerships to prevent trade in WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. Successful efforts involving PSI partners are a reality. States must cooperate to make it more difficult and more costly for proliferators to engage in this deadly trade. Over time, proliferators, and others involved in supporting proliferation activities, will learn that there are countries determined to work together to take all possible steps to stop their efforts. PSI is an important contribution to global nonproliferation and is a strong deterrent to proliferation-related trafficking. PSI also seeks enhanced law enforcement cooperation to shut down proliferation-related networks and activities and bring those involved to justice. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles (adopted in Paris, September 4, 2003) The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles." PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to, international peace and security to join in similarly committing to: Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include: Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding an searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, of contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.